Abstract. Verifiable computation allows a client to outsource computations to a worker with a cryptographic proof of correctness of the result that can be verified faster than performing the computation. Recently, the Pinocchio system achieved faster verification than computation in practice for the first time. Unfortunately, Pinocchio and other efficient verifiable computation systems require the client to disclose the inputs to the worker, which is undesirable for sensitive inputs. To solve this problem, we propose Trinocchio: a system that distributes Pinocchio to three (or more) workers, that each individually do not learn which inputs they are computing on. We fully exploit the almost linear structure of Pinochhio proofs, letting each worker essentially perform the work for a single Pinocchio proof; verification by the client remains the same. Moreover, we extend Trinocchio to enable joint computation with multiple mutually distrusting inputters and outputters and still very fast verification. We show the feasibility of our approach by analysing the performance of an implementation in a case study. This is the full version (with security proof ) of the ACNS'16 paper [31] 
Introduction
Recent cryptographic advances are starting to make verifiable computation more and more practical. The goal of verifiable computation is to allow a client to outsource a computation to a worker and cryptographically verify the result with less effort than performing the computation itself. Based on recent ground-breaking ideas [22, 18] , Pinocchio [27] was the first implemented system to achieve this for some realistic computations. Recent works have improved the state-of-the-art in verifiable computation, e.g., by considering better ways to specify computations [5] , or adding access control [1] .
However, one feature not yet available in practical verifiable computation is privacy, meaning that the worker should not learn the inputs that it is computing on. This feature would enable a client to save time by outsourcing computations, even if the inputs of those computations are so sensitive that it does not want to disclose them to the worker. Also, it would allow verifiable computation to be used in settings where multiple clients do not trust the worker or each other, but still want to perform a joint computation over their respective inputs and be sure of the correctness of the result.
While privacy was already defined in the first paper to formalize verifiable computation [17] , it has not been shown so far how it is efficiently achieved, with existing constructions relying on efficient cryptographic primitives. By outsourcing a computation to multiple workers, it is possible to guarantee privacy (if not all workers are corrupted) and correctness, but existing constructions from the multiparty literature lose the most appealing feature of verifiable computation: namely, that computations can be verified very quickly, even in time independent from the computation size. This leads to the central question of this paper: can we perform verifiable computation with the correctness and performance guarantees of [27] , but while also getting privacy against corrupted workers?
Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce Trinocchio to show that indeed, it is possible to outsource a computation in a privacy-preserving way to multiple workers, while retaining the fast verification offered by verifiable computation. Trinocchio uses state-of-the-art [27] -style proofs, but distributes the computation of these proofs to, e.g., three workers such that no single worker learns anything about the inputs. The client essentially gets a normal Pinocchio proof, so we keep Pinocchio's correctness guarantees and fast verification. The critical observation is that the almost linear structure of Pinocchio proofs (supporting verification based on bilinear maps) allows us to distribute the computation of Pinocchio proofs such that individual workers perform essentially the same work as a normal Pinocchio prover in the non-distributed setting. Specifically, our contributions are:
-We show how to distribute the production of Pinocchio proofs in a privacypreserving way to multiple workers, thereby achieving privacy-preserving verifiable computation in the setting with one client -We extend our system to settings with multiple distrusting input and result parties -We provide a precise security model capturing the security guarantees of our protocols: privacy, correctness, but also input independence -We demonstrate the practical feasibility of our approach by implementing a case study: we demonstrate Trinocchio's low overhead by repeating the multivariate polynomial evaluation case study of [27] 's.
While our Trinocchio protocol ensures correct function evaluation, it only fully protects privacy against semi-honest workers. This is a realistic attacker model; in particular, it means that side channel attacks on individual workers are ineffective because each individual worker's communication and computation are completely independent from the sensitive inputs. However, even if an adversary should be able to obtain sensitive information, they are unable to manipulate the result thanks to the use of verifiable computation. In this way, our protocol hedges against the risk of more powerful adversaries.
Related Work
Privacy-preserving outsourcing to single workers has been considered in the literature, but constructions in this setting rely on inefficient cryptographic primitives like fully homomorphic encryption [17, 11, 16] , functional encryption [20] , and multi-input attribute-based encryption [21] . (This is not surprising: indeed, even without guaranteeing correctness, letting a single worker perform a computation on inputs it does not know would intuitively seem to require some form of fully homomorphic encryption.) Some of these works also consider a multi-client setting [11, 21] .
A large body of works considers multiparty computation for privacy-preserving outsourcing (see, e.g., [24, 28, 9, 23] ). These works do not consider verifiability and achieve correctness at best in the case that all-but-one workers are corrupt (due to inherent limitations of the underlying protocols). We stress that this is rather unsatisfactory for the outsourcing scenario, where one naturally wishes to cover the case that all workers are corrupt-dispensing of the need to trust any particular worker.
Concerning outsourcing to multiple workers, [2] presents a verifiable computation protocol combining privacy and correctness; but unfortunately, they guarantee neither privacy nor correctness if all workers are corrupted and may collude; and it places a much higher burden on the workers than, e.g., [27] . Alternatively, recent works [3, ?,30] , like us, guarantee correctness independent of worker corruption, but privacy only under some conditions. Our work offers a substantial performance improvement over these works by fully exploiting a setup that needs to be trusted both for guaranteeing privacy and for guaranteeing correctness.
We should mention that the notion of verifiability exists in various forms and the field has a richer background than presented here, however, we focus entirely on the notion of verifiable computation first formalized by [17] , because it is tailored to the outsourcing scenario.
Outline
We first briefly define the security model for privacy-preserving outsourced computation in Section 2. In Section 3, we show how Trinocchio distributes the proof computation of Pinocchio in the single-client scenario, and prove security of the construction. We generalise Trinocchio to the setting with multiple, mutually distrusting inputters and outputters in Section 4. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of Trinocchio in Section 5 by analysing its performance in a case study, computing a multivariate polynomial evaluation. We finish with a discussion and conclusions in Section 6.
For convenience, we also provide a brief overview of the Pinocchio protocol [27] for verifiable computation based on quadratic arithmetic programs in Appendix A.
Secure function evaluation:
-Honest parties send inputs xi to trusted party -Adversary sends inputs xi of corrupted parties to trusted party (active adversary may modify them) -Trusted party computes function (y1, . . . , ym) = f (x1, . . . , xm) (where y1 = . . . = ⊥ if any xi = ⊥) -Trusted party provides outputs yi for corrupted parties to adversary -Trusted party provides outputs yi to honest parties -Honest parties output received value; corrupted parties output ⊥; adversary chooses own output Correct function evaluation:
-Honest parties send inputs xi to trusted party -Adversary sends inputs xi of corrupted parties to trusted party (active adversary may modify them) -Trusted party computes function (y1, . . . , ym) = f (x1, . . . , xm) (where y1 = . . . = ⊥ if any xi = ⊥) -Trusted party provides all inputs xi to adversary -Adversary gives subset of honest parties to trusted party (passive adversary gives all honest parties) -Trusted party sends outputs yi to given honest parties, ⊥ to others -Honest parties output received value; corrupted parties output ⊥; adversary chooses own output 
Security Model for Privacy-Preserving Outsourcing
In this section, we define security for privacy-preserving outsourcing. Because we have interactive protocols between multiple parties (as opposed to a cryptographic scheme, like verifiable computation above), we define security using the ideal/real-paradigm [6] . In our setting, the parties are several result parties that wish to obtain the result of a computation on inputs held by several input parties, who are willing to enable the computation, but not to divulge their private input values to anybody else. Therefore, they outsource the computation to several workers. (Input and result parties may overlap.) The simplest case is the "single-client scenario" in which one party is the single input/result party. We consider protocols operating in three phases: an input phase involving the input parties and workers; a computation phase involving only the workers; and a result phase involving the workers and result parties. The work of the input parties and output parties should depend only on the number of other parties and the size of their own in/outputs.
To define security, we will re-use the existing definition framework for secure function evaluation [6] . These definitions not specific to the outsourcing setting; but the outsourcing setting will become apparent when we claim that a protocol, e.g., implements secure function evaluation if at most X workers are corrupted. Secure function evaluation is the problem to evaluate (y 1 , . . . , y m ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with m parties such that the ith party inputs x i and obtains y i , and no party learns anything else. (In outsourcing, result parties have non-empty output, input parties have non-empty inputs, and workers have empty in-and outputs.) A protocol π securely evaluates function f if the outputs of the parties and adversary A in a real-world execution of the protocol can be emulated by the outputs of the parties and an adversary S A in an idealised execution, where f is computed by a trusted party that acts as shown in Figure 1 . Security is guaranteed because the trusted party correctly computes the function. Privacy is guaranteed because the adversary in the idealised execution does not learn anything it should not. Secure evaluation also implies input independence, meaning that an input party cannot let its input depend on that of another, e.g., by copying the input of another party; this is guaranteed because the adversary needs to provide the inputs of corrupted parties without seeing the honest inputs. Typically, protocols achieve secure function evaluation for a given, restricted class of adversaries, e.g., adversaries that are passive and only corrupt a certain number of workers. Protocols can require set-up assumptions; these are captured by giving protocol participants access to a set of functions g 1 , . . . , g k that are always evaluated correctly. In this case, we say that the protocol securely evaluates the function in the (g 1 , . . . , g k )-hybrid model. For details, see [6] .
We only achieve secure function evaluation if not too many workers are corrupted; we still need to formalise that in all other cases, we still guarantee that the function was evaluated correctly. This weaker security guarantee, which we call correct function evaluation, captures security and input independence, as above, but not privacy. It is formalised by modifying the ideal-world execution as shown in Figure 1 . Namely, after evaluating f , the trusted party provides all inputs to the adversary (modelling that the computation may leak the inputs), who, based on these inputs, can decide which honest parties are allowed to see their outputs. Hence, we guarantee that, if an honest party gets a result, then it gets the correct result of the computation on independently chosen inputs, but not that the inputs remain hidden, or that it gets a result at all. Note that, in this definition, the adversary has complete control over which result parties see an output and which ones do not.
Distributing the Prover Computation
In this section, we present the single-client version of our Trinocchio protocol for privacy-preserving outsourcing. In Trinocchio, a client distributes computation of a function x 2 = f (x 1 ) to n workers (we consider here single-valued input and output, but the generalisation is straightforward). Trinocchio guarantees correct function evaluation (regardless of corruptions) and secure function evaluation (if at most θ workers are passively corrupted, where n = 2θ + 1). Trinocchio in effect distributes the proof computation of Pinocchio; the number of workers to obtain privacy against one semi-honest worker is three, hence its name.
Multiparty Computation using Shamir Secret Sharing
To distribute the Pinocchio computation, Trinocchio employs multiparty computation techniques based on Shamir secret sharing [4] . Recall that in (θ, n) Shamir secret sharing, a party shares a secret s among n parties so that θ + 1 parties are needed to reconstruct s. It does this by taking a random degree-≤ θ polynomial p(x) = α θ x θ + . . . + αx + s with s as constant term and giving p(i) to party i. Since p(x) is of degree at most θ, p(0) is completely independent from any θ shares but can be easily computed from any θ + 1 shares by Lagrange interpolation. We denote such a sharing as JsK. Note that Shamir-sharing can also be done "in the exponent", e.g., J a 1 K denotes a Shamir sharing of a 1 ∈ G 1 from which a 1 can be computed using Lagrange interpolation in G 1 .
Shamir secret sharing is linear, i.e., Ja + bK = JaK + JbK and JαaK = αJaK can be computed locally. When computing the product of JaK and JbK, each party i can locally multiply its points p a (i) and p b (i) on the random polynomials p a and p b . Because the product polynomial has degree at most 2θ, this is a (2θ, n) sharing, which we write as [a · b] (note that reconstructing the secret requires n = 2θ + 1 parties). Moreover, the distribution of the shares of [a · b] is not independent from the values of a and b, so when revealed, these shares reveal information about a and b. Hence, in multiparty computation, [a · b] is typically converted back into a random (θ, n) sharing Ja · bK using an interactive protocol due to [19] . Interactive protocols for many other tasks such as comparing two shared value also exist (see, e.g., [15] ).
The Trinocchio protocol
We now present the Trinocchio protocol. Trinocchio assumes that Pinocchio's KeyGen has been correctly performed: formally, Trinocchio works in the KeyGenhybrid model. Furthermore, Trinocchio assumes pairwise private, synchronous communication channels. To obtain x 2 = f (x 1 ), a client proceeds in four steps:
-The client obtains the verification key, and the workers obtain the evaluation key, using hybrid calls to KeyGen. -The client secret shares Jx 1 K of its input to the workers. -The workers use multiparty computation to compute secret-shares Jx 2 K of the output and Algorithm 1 shows in detail how the secret-shares of the function output and Pinocchio proof are computed. The first step is to compute function output x 2 = f (x 1 ) and values (x 3 , . . . , x k ) such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of the QAP (line 4). This is done using normal multiparty computation protocols based on secret sharing. If function f is represented by an arithmetic circuit, then it is evaluated using local addition and scalar multiplication, and the multiplication protocol from [19] . If f is represented by a circuit using more complicated gates, then specific protocols may be used: e.g., the split gate discussed in Appendix A.1 can be evaluated using multiparty bit decomposition protocols [13, 
[
29]. Any protocol can be used as long as it guarantees privacy, i.e., the view of any θ workers is statistically independent from the values represented by the shares. The next task is to compute, in secret-shared form, the coefficients of the
that we need for proof element H 1 . In theory, this computation could be performed by first computing shares of the coefficients of ( i x i v i ) · ( i x i w i ) − ( i x i y i ), and then dividing by t, which can be done locally using traditional polynomial long division. However, this scales quadratically in the degree of the QAP and hence leads to unacceptable performance. Hence, we take the approach based on fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) from [5] , and adapt it to the distributed setting. Given a list S = {ω 1 , . . . , ω d } of distinct points in F, we denote by P = FFT S (p) the transformation from coefficients p of a polynomial p of degree at most d − 1 to evaluations p(ω 1 ), . . . , p(ω d ) in the points in S. We denote by p = FFT −1 S (P ) the inverse transformation, i.e., from evaluations to coefficients. Deferring specifics to later, we mention now that the FFT is a linear transformation that, for some S, can be performed locally on secret shares in O(d · log d).
With FFTs available, we can compute the coefficients of h by evaluating h in d distinct points and applying FFT −1 . Note that we can efficiently compute evaluations v of v = ( i x i v i ), w of w = ( i x i w i ), and y of y = ( i x i y i ) in the zeros {ω 1 , . . . , ω d } of the target polynomial. Namely, the values v k (ω i ), w k (ω i ), y k (ω i ) are simply the coefficients of the quadratic equations represented by the QAP, most of which are zero, so these sums have much fewer than k elements (if this were not the case, then evaluating v, w, and y would take an unacceptable O(d·k)). Unfortunately, we cannot use these evaluations directly to obtain evaluations of h, because this requires division by the target polynomial, which is zero in exactly these points ω i . Hence, after determining v, w, and y, we first use the inverse FFT to determine the coefficients V , W , and Y of v, w, and y, and then again the FFT to compute the evaluations v , w , and y of v, w, and y in another set of points T = {Ω 1 , . . . , Ω k } (lines 5-7). Now, we can compute evaluations h of h in T using h(
This requires a multiplication of (θ, n)-secret shares of v(Ω i ) and w(Ω i ), hence the result is a (2θ, n)-sharing. Finally, the inverse FFT gives us a (2θ, n)-sharing of the coefficients H of h (line 8).
Given secret shares of the values of x i and coefficients of h, it is straightforward to compute secret shares of the Pinocchio proof. Indeed, V mid 1 , . . . , H 1 are all computed as linear combinations of elements in the evaluation key, so shares of these proof elements can be computed locally (lines 9-16), and finally returned by the respective workers (lines [17] [18] .
Note that, compared to Pinocchio, our client needs to carry out slightly more work. Namely, our client needs to produce secret shares of the inputs and recombine secret shares of the outputs; and it needs to recombine the Pinocchio proof. However, according to the micro-benchmarks from [27] , this overhead is small. For each input and output, Verify includes three exponentiations, whereas Combine involves four additions and two multiplications; when using [27] 's techniques, this adds at most a 3% overhead. Recombining the Pinocchio proof involves 15 exponentiations at around half the cost of a single pairing. Alternatively, it is possible to let one of the workers perform the Pinocchio recombining step by using the distributed zero-knowledge variant of Pinocchio (Appendix A.3) and the techniques from Section 4. In this case, the only overhead for the client is the secret-sharing of the inputs and zero-knowledge randomness, and recombining the outputs.
Parameters for Efficient FFTs
To obtain efficient FFTs, we use the approach of [5] . There, it is noted that the operation P = FFT S (p) and its inverse can be efficiently implemented if S = {ω, ω 2 , . . . , ω d = 1} is a set of powers of a primitive dth root of unity, where d is a power of two. (We can always demand that QAPs have degree d = 2 k for some k by adding dummy equations.) Moreover, [5] presents a pair of groups G 1 , G 2 of order q such that F q has a primitive 2 30 th root of unity (and hence also primitive 2 k th roots of unity for any k < 30) as well as an efficiently computable pairing e :
T can easily be reduced to FFT S and FFT −1 S , respectively. In our implementation, we use exactly these suggested parameters. -Trinocchio correctly evaluates f in the KeyGen-hybrid model.
-Whenever at most θ workers are passively corrupted, Trinocchio securely evaluates f in the KeyGen-hybrid model.
The proof of this theorem is easily derived as a special case of the proof for the multi-client Trinocchio protocol later. Here, we present a short sketch.
Proof (Sketch). To prove correct function evaluation, we need to show that for every real-world adversary A interacting with Trinocchio, there is an ideal-world simulator S A that interacts with the trusted party for correct function evaluation such that the two executions give indistinguishable results. The only interesting case is when the client is honest and some of the workers are not. In this case, the simulator receives the input of the honest party, and needs to choose whether to provide the output. To this end, the simulator simply simulates a run of the actual protocol with A, until it has finally obtained function output x 2 and the accompanying Trinocchio proof. If the proof verifies, it tells the trusted party to provide the output to the client; otherwise, it tells the trusted party not to. Finally, the simulator outputs whatever A outputs. Because Trinocchio is secure, except with negligible probability a verifying proof implies that the real-world output of the client (as given by the adversary) matches the ideal-world output of the client (as computed by the trusted party); and by construction, the outputs of A and S A are distributed identically. This proves correct function evaluation.
For secure function evaluation, again the only interesting case is if the client is honest and some of the workers are passively corrupted. In this case, because corruption is only passive, correctness of the multiparty protocol used to compute f and correctness of the Pinocchio proof system used to compute the proof together imply that real-world executions (like ideal-world executions) result in the correct function result and a verifying proof. Hence, we only need to worry about how S A can simulate the view of A on the Trinocchio protocol without knowing the client's input. However, note that the workers only use a multiparty computation to compute f (which we assume can be simulated without knowing the inputs), after which they no longer receive any messages. Hence simulating the multiparty computation for f and receiving any messages that A sends is sufficient to simulate A. This proves secure function evaluation.
Privacy against Active Attacks We remark that actually, Trinocchio in some cases provides privacy against corrupted workers as well. Namely, suppose that the protocol used to compute f does not leak any information to corrupted workers in the event of an active attack (even though in this case it may not guarantee correctness). For instance, this is the case for the protocol from [19] : the attacker can manipulate the shares that it sends, which makes the computation return incorrect results; but since the attacker always learns only θ many shares of any value, it does not learn any information. Because the attacker learns no additional information from producing the Pinocchio proof, the overall protocol still leaks no information to the adversary. (And security of Pinocchio ensures the client notices the attacker's manipulation.)
This crucially relies on the workers not learning whether the client accepts the proof: if the workers would learn whether the client obtained a validating proof,
Algorithm 2 ProofBlock
1: function ProofBlock(BK; x; δv, δw, δy) 2:
then, by manipulating proof construction, they could learn whether a modified version of the tuple (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of the QAP used, so corrupted workers could learn one chosen bit of information about the inputs (cf. [26] ).
Handling Mutually Distrusting In-and Outputters
We now consider the scenario where there are multiple (possibly overlapping) input and result parties. There are some significant changes between this scenario and the single-client scenario. In particular, we need to extend Pinocchio to allow verification not based on the actual input/output values (indeed, no party sees all of them) but on some kind of representation that does not reveal them. Moreover, we need to use the zero-knowledge variant of Pinocchio (Appendix A.3), and we need to make sure that input parties choose their inputs independently from each other.
Multi-Client Proofs and Keys
Our multi-client Trinocchio proofs are a generalisation of the zero-knowledge variant of Pinocchio (Appendix A.3) with modified evaluation and verification keys. Recall that in Pinocchio, the proof terms
, and Z 1 encode circuit values x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ; in the zero-knowledge variant, these terms are randomised so that they do not reveal any information about x l+m+1 , . . . , x k . In the multi-client case, additionally, the inputs of all input parties and the outputs of all result parties need to be encoded such that no other party learns any information about them. Therefore, we extend the proof with blocks of the above seven terms for each input and result party, which are constructed in the same way as the seven proof terms above. Although some result parties could share a block of output values, for simplicity we assign each result party its own block in the protocol.
To produce a block containing values x, a party first samples three random field values δ v , δ w , and δ y and then executes ProofBlock, cf. Algorithm 2. The BK argument to this algorithm is the block key; the subset of the evaluation key terms specific to a single proof block. Because each input party should only provide its own input values and should not affect the values contributed by other parties, each proof block must be restricted to a subset of the wires. This is achieved by modifying Pinocchio's key generation such that, instead of a sampling a single
return ⊥ value β, one such value, β j , is sampled for each proof block j and the terms r v β j v i + r w β j w i + r y β j y i 1 are only included for wires indices i belonging to block j. That is, the jth block key is
with i ranging over the indices of wires in the block. Note that ProofBlock only performs linear operations on its x, δ v , δ w and δ y inputs. Therefore this algorithm does not have to be modified to compute on secret shares. A Trinocchio proof in the multi-client setting now consists of one block Q i = ( V i 1 , . . . , Z i 1 ) for each input and result party, one block Q mid = ( V mid 1 , . . . , Z mid 1 ) of internal wire values, and Pinocchio's H 1 element. Verification of such a proof consists of checking correctness of each block, and checking correctness of H 1 . The validity of a proof block can be verified using CheckBlock, cf. Algorithm 3. Compared to the Pinocchio verification key, our verification key contains "block verification keys" BV i (i.e., elements β j 1 and β j 2 ) for each block instead of just β 1 and β 2 . Apart from the relations inspected by CheckBlock, one other relation is needed to verify a Pinocchio proof: the divisibility check of Equation (4) (Appendix A.2). In the protocol, the algorithm that verifies this relation will be called CheckDiv. We denote the modified setup of the evaluation and verification keys by hybrid call MKeyGen.
Protocol Overview
We will proceed with a protocol overview. Pseudocode and a more detailed description of the protocol are given in Appendix B. The multi-client variant of our Trinicchio protocol makes use of private channels, just as the single-client variant, to privately communicate in-and output values, and to let the workers carry out the computation. We need some additional communication to ensure input independence and fix the input parties' values. For this we use a bulletin board. To achieve input independence, we first have the input parties commit to a representation of their input and then reveal these, which requires the use of a commitment scheme.
Apart from key set-up there are three phases to the multi-client Trinocchio protocol.
-In the input phase, the input parties provide representations of their input on the bulletin board. These representations are later used as part of the proof to verify the computation results. They also serve to ensure that each input party provides its value independent of the other input values. The input parties then secret share their input values to the workers. The workers verify that the secret shared input values are consistent with their representations on the bulletin board, to prevent malicious input parties from providing a different value. -The computation phase is very similar to the single-client variant of Trinocchio. In this phase the workers perform multi-party computation to carry out the actual computation and obtain secret shares of intermediate and result wire values. They then use these secret shared wire values to construct shares of the proof elements. These are then posted on the bulletin board, instead of being communicated directly to the result parties to ensure that all result parties receive a consistent result. In order to prevent these proof elements from revealing any information about the wire values, the zero-knowledge variant of the proof is used (Appendix A.3). -In the result phase the workers privately send the shares of the result values to the result parties. The result parties recombine the proof shares from the bulletin board and check whether the proof verifies. The result parties further check whether the recombined shares of the result are consistent with the information on the bulletin board. The result parties only accept the result received from the workers if both checks are satisfied.
Security of the Trinocchio Protocol
Analogously to the single-client case, we obtain the following result: We stress that "at most θ workers are passively corrupted" includes both the case when the adversary is passively corrupted, and corrupts at most θ workers (as well as arbitrarily many input and result parties); and the case when the adversary is actively corrupted, and corrupts no workers (but arbitrarily many input and result parties)
We give a proof of this theorem in Appendix B. To prove secure function evaluation, we obtain privacy by simulating the multiparty computation of the proof with respect to the adversary without using honest inputs. To prove correct function evaluation, we run the protocol together with the adversary: if this gives a fake Pinocchio proof, then one of the underlying problems can be broken.
In the single-client case, we remarked that Trinocchio actually provides security against up to θ actively corrupted workers. Namely, although θ actively corrupted workers may manipulate the computation of the function and proof, they do not learn any information from this because they do not see the resulting proof that the client gets. In our multi-client protocol, it is less natural to assume that the workers cannot see the resulting proof; and in fact, in our protocol, corrupted workers do see the full proof as it is posted on the bulletin board. It should be possible to obtain some privacy guarantees against actively malicious workers (who do not collude with any result parties) by letting the result parties provide proof contributions directly to the result parties instead of posting them on the bulletin board. We leave an analysis for future work.
Performance
In this section, we show that our approach indeed adds privacy to verifiable computation with little overhead. We demonstrate this in a case study: we take the "MultiVar Poly" application from [27] , and show that using Trinocchio, this computation can be outsourced in a private and correct way at essentially the same cost as letting three workers each perform the Pinocchio computation.
In our experiments, one client outsources the computation to three workers. In particular, we use multiparty computation based on (1, 3) Shamir secret sharing. As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.3, this guarantees privacy against one passively corrupted worker (or, in the single-client case against θ actively corrupted workers when the multiparty computation protocol does not leak any information). We did not implement the multiple client scenario; this would add small overhead for the workers, with verification effort growing linearly in he number of input and result parties but remaining small and independent from the computation size. To simulate a realistic outsourcing scenario, we distribute computations between three Amazon EC2 "m3.medium" instances 3 around the world: one in Oregon, United States; one in Ireland; and one in Tokyo, Japan. Multiparty computation requires secure and private channels: these are implemented using SSL.
Case Study: Multivariate Polynomial Evaluation
In [27] , Pinocchio performance numbers are presented showing that, for some applications, Pinocchio verification is faster than native execution. One of these applications, "MultiVar Poly", is the evaluation of a constant multivariate polynomial on five inputs of degree 8 ("medium") or 10 ("large"). In this case study, we use Trinocchio to add privacy to this outsourcing scenario.
We 
the function f (line 4), given as an arithmetic circuit, using the secret sharing implementation of VIFF. (We use the arithmetic circuit produced by the Pinocchio compiler, hence f is exactly the same as in [27] .) Note that, because f is an arithmetic circuit, this step does not leak any information against actively corrupted workers. Hence, in the single-client outsourcing scenario of Section 3, we achieve privacy against one actively corrupted worker. The second part is a completely new implementation of the remainder of Trinocchio using [25] 's implementation of the discrete logarithm groups and pairings from [5] . Table 1 shows the performance numbers of running this application in the cloud with Trinocchio. Significantly, evaluating the function f using passively secure multiparty computation (i.e., line 4 of Compute) is more than twenty times cheaper than computing the Pinocchio proof (i.e., lines 5-16 of Comp). Moreover, we see that computing the Pinocchio proof in the distributed setting takes around the same time (per party) as in the non-distributed setting. Indeed, this is what we expect because the computation that takes place is exactly the same as in the non-distributed setting, except that it happens to take place on shares rather than the actual values itself. Hence, according to these numbers, the cost of privacy is essentially that the computation is outsourced to three different workers, that each have to perform the same work as one worker in the non-private setting. Finally, as expected, verification time completely vanishes compared to computation time.
Our performance numbers should be interpreted as estimates. Our Pinocchio performance is around 8-9 times worse than in [27] ; but on the other hand, we could not use their proprietary elliptic curve and pairing implementations; and we did not spend much time optimising performance. Note that, as expected, our Pinocchio and Trinocchio implementations have approximately the same running time. If Trinocchio would be based on Pinocchio's code base, we would expect the same. Moreover, apart from combining the proofs from different workers, the verification routines of Pinocchio and Trinocchio are exactly the same, so achieving faster verification than native computation as in [27] should be possible with Trinocchio as well. We also note that VIFF is not known for its speed, so replacing VIFF with a different multiparty computation framework should considerably speed up the computation of f .
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented Trinocchio, a system that adds privacy to the Pinocchio verifiable computation scheme essentially at the cost of replicating the Pinocchio proof production algorithm at three (or more) servers. Trinocchio has the same correctness and security guarantees as Pinocchio; distributing the computation between 2θ + 1 workers gives privacy if at most θ of them are corrupted. We have shown in a case study that the overhead is indeed small.
As far as we are aware, our work is the first to deliver efficient verifiable computation (i.e., with cryptographic guarantees of correctness and practical verification times independent of the computation size) with privacy guarantees. Although privacy is only guaranteed if not too many of the workers are corrupt, the use of verifiable computation ensures that the outcome of the protocol cannot be manipulated by the workers. This allows us to hedge against an adversary being more powerful than anticipated in a real world scenario.
As discussed, existing verifiable computation constructions in the singleworker setting [17, 20, 16] use very expensive cryptography, while multiple-worker efforts to provide privacy [2] do not guarantee correctness if all workers are corrupted. In contrast, existing works from the area of multiparty computation [3, 30 , ?] deliver privacy and correctness guarantees, but have much less efficient verification.
A major limitation of Pinocchio-based approaches is that they assume trusted set-up of the (function-dependent) evaluation and verification keys. In the singleclient setting, the client could perform this set-up itself, but in the multiple-client setting, it is less clear who should do this. In particular, whoever has generated the evaluation and verification keys can use the values used during key generation as a trapdoor to generate proofs of false statements. Even though key generation can likely be distributed using the same techniques we use to distribute proof production, it remains the case that all generating parties together know this trapdoor. Unfortunately, this seems inherent to the Pinocchio approach.
Our work is a first step towards privacy-preserving verifiable computation, and we see many promising directions for future work. Recent work in verifiable computation has extended the Pinocchio approach by making it easier to specify computations [5] , and by adding access control functionality [1] . In future work, it would be interesting to see how these kind of techniques can be used in the Trinocchio setting. Also, recent work has focused on applying verifiable computation on large amounts of data held by the server (and possibly signed by a third party) [10] ; assessing the impact of distributing the computation (in particular when aggregating information from databases from several parties) in this scenario is also an important future direction. It would also be interesting to base Trinocchio on the (much faster) Pinocchio codebase [27] and more efficient multiparty computation implementations, and see what kind of performance improvements can be achieved. Another interesting direction is to investigate the possibility of practical universally composable [7, 8] distributed verifiable computation; or to use the universal composability framework to obtain a more generic framework for combining multiparty computation with verifiable computation (even with only standalone guarantees).
A Verifiable Computation from QAPs
In this section, we discuss the protocol for verifiable computation based on quadratic arithmetic programs from [18, 27] .
A.1 Modelling Computations as Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
A quadratic arithmetic program, or QAP, is a way of encoding arithmetic circuits, and some more general computations, over a field F of prime order q. It is given by a collection of polynomials over F.
Definition 1 ([27]). A quadratic arithmetic program
The polynomial t is called the target polynomial. The size of the QAP is k; the degree is the degree d of t.
In the remainder, for ease of notation, we adopt the convention that x 0 = 1.
In case t splits, i.e., t = (x−α 1 )·. . .·(x−α n ), a QAP can be seen as a collection of rank-1 quadratic equations for (x 1 , . . . , x k ); that is, equations v · w − y with v, w, y ∈ F[x 1 , . . . , x k ] of degree at most one. Namely, (
can be turned into a QAP by selecting d distinct elements α 1 , . . . , α d in F, setting target polynomial t = (x − α 1 ) · . . . · (x − α d ), and defining v 0 to be the unique polynomial of degree smaller than d for which v 0 (α j ) = v j 0 , etcetera. A QAP is said to compute a function (x l+1 , . . . , x l+m ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x l ) if the remaining x i give a solution exactly if the function is correctly evaluated.
Definition 3 ([27]
). Let Q = ({v i }, {w i }, {y i }, t) be a QAP, and let f :
For any function f given by an arithmetic circuit, we can easily construct a QAP that computes the function f . Indeed, we can describe an arithmetic circuit as a series of rank-1 quadratic equations by letting each multiplication gate become one equation. Apart from circuits containing just addition and multiplication gates, we can also express circuits with some other kinds of gates directly as QAPs. For instance, [27] defines a "split gate" that converts a number a into its k-bit decomposition a 1 , . . . , a k with equations a = a 1 + 2 · a 2 + . . .
A.2 Proving Correctness of Computations
If QAP Q = ({v i }, {w i }, {y i }, t) computes a function f , then a prover can prove that (x l+1 , . . . , x l+m ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x l ) by proving knowledge of values (x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ) such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of Q, i.e., t divides (
. [27] gives a construction of a proof system which does exactly this. The proof system assumes discrete logarithm groups G 1 , G 2 , G 3 with a pairing e : G 1 ×G 2 → G 3 for which the (4d+4)-PDH, d-PKE and (8d+8)-SDH assumptions [27] hold, with d the degree of the QAP. Moreover, the proof is in the common reference string (CRS) model: the CRS consists of an evaluation key used to produce the proof, and a verification key used to verify it. Both are public, i.e., provers can know the verification key and vice versa.
, the prover computes quotient polynomial h = p/t and basically provides evaluations "in the exponent" of h, ( i x i v i ), ( i x i w i ), and ( i x i y i ) in an unknown point s that can be verified using the pairing. More precisely, given generators g 1 of G 1 and g 2 of G 2 (written additively) and polynomial f ∈ F[x], let us write f 1 for g 1 · f (s) and f 2 for g 2 · f (s). The evaluation key in the CRS, generated using random s, α v , α w , α y , β, r v , r w , r y = r v · r w ∈ F, is:
where i ranges over l + m + 1, l + m + 2, . . . , k and j runs from 0 to the degree of t. The proof contains the following elements:
where i ranges over l + m + 1, l + m + 2, . . . , k, and h j are the coefficients of polynomial h = p/t.
To verify that t divides ( i x i v i )·( i x i w i )−( i x i y i ) and hence (x l+1 , . . . , x l+m ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x l ), a verifier uses the following verification key from the CRS:
where i ranges over 0, 1, 2, . . . , l + m 5 . Given the verification key, a proof, and values x 1 , . . . , x l+m , the verifier proceeds as follows. First, it checks that (2) intuitively, under the d-PKE assumption, these checks guarantee that the prover must have constructed V mid 1 , W mid 2 , and Y mid 1 using the elements from the evaluation key. It then checks that
under the PDH assumption, this guarantees that the same coefficients x i were used in V mid 1 , W mid 2 , and Y mid 1 . Finally, the verifier computes evaluations 
under the (8d + 8)-SDH assumption, this guarantees that, for the polynomial h encoded by
Theorem 3 ( [18] , informal). Given QAP Q = ({v i }, {w i }, {y i }, t) and values x 1 , . . . , x l+m , the above is a non-interactive argument of knowledge of (x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ) such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of Q.
A.3 Making the Proof Zero-Knowledge
The above proof can be turned into a zero-knowledge proof, that reveals nothing about the values of (x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ) other than that t divides (
Precisely, the evaluation key needs to contain additional elements:
r v t 1 , r v α v t 1 , r w t 2 , r w α w t 1 , r y t 1 , r y α y t 1 , r v βt 1 , r w βt 1 , r y βt 1 , t 1 .
Compared to the original proof, we let
Verification remains exactly the same.
Theorem 4 ([18], informal).
Given QAP Q = ({v i }, {w i }, {y i }, t) and values x 1 , . . . , x l+m , the above is a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of (x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ) such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of Q.
A.4 From Arguments of Knowledge to Verifiable Computation
In [27] , the above argument of knowledge is used to construct a public verifiable computation scheme. In such a scheme, a client outsources the computation of a function f to a worker, obtaining cryptographic guarantees that the result it gets from the worker is correct. It is defined as follows:
Definition 4 ([27]).
A public verifiable computation scheme VC consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, Compute, Verify):
: a probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes as argument a function f : F l → F m and a security parameter λ, outputting a public evaluation key EK f and a public verification key VK f -(y; π) ← Compute(EK f ; x): a probabilistic worker algorithm that takes input x ∈ F l and outputs y = f (x) ∈ F k and a proof π of its correctness -{0, 1} ← Verify(VK f ; x; y; π): a deterministic verification algorithm that outputs 1 if y = f (x), 0 otherwise.
To outsource the computation of f , a client runs KeyGen and provides EK f to the worker. When it needs f (x), it provides x to the worker, who runs Compute and provides the result y = f (x) and proof π to the client. The client accepts y if Verify succeeds. We require that worker cannot provide incorrect proofs even if it knows VK f , which makes this verifiable computation scheme "public". In fact, a trusted party could for once and for all perform KeyGen and publish (EK f , VK f ); any client who trusts this party can then use the published VK f to verify computations. (Trusting this party is needed: the random values used in KeyGen are a trapdoor with which the generator of the keys can produce false proofs.) A public verifiable computation scheme should satisfy correctness and security. Correctness means that honest workers produce accepting proofs:
Definition 5 ([27]).
A public verifiable computation scheme VC is called correct if, for all f : F l → F m and x ∈ F:
then Verify(VK f ; x; y; π) = 1.
Security means that corrupt workers cannot convince clients of wrong results:
Definition 6 ([27]).
A public verifiable computation scheme VC is called secure if, for any f : F l → F m and probabilistic polynomial time adversary A:
Given a QAP Q that computes a function f , the argument of knowledge from Section A.2 directly gives a public verifiable computation scheme known as Pinocchio [27] : KeyGen is the computation of the evaluation and verification keys for Q; Compute computes (x l+1 , . . . , x l+m ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x l ), (x l+m+1 , . . . , x k ) such that (x 1 , . . . , x k ) is a solution of Q, and proof (1); and Verify are the checks (2-4) for this proof.
Theorem 5 (Pinocchio [27] , informal). Let QAP Q be of degree d. Then the above construction is a secure and correct public verifiable computation scheme under the d-PKE, (4d + 4)-PDH, and (8d + 8)-SDH assumptions.
B Multi-client Protocol and Security Proof
In this appendix we will give a more detailed description of the multi-client protocol of Section 4 and the security proof.
B.1 The Protocol
We now present our multi-client Trinocchio protocol in more detail. As before, we assume that each input party provides only a single input and each result party receives only a single output; that is, each block from Section 4.1 consists of only one wire. It should be clear from Section 4.1 how this can be generalised.
Communication Model and Notation
We assume synchronous communication; pairwise secure channels between the input parties and workers; between the workers themselves; and between the workers and result parties. To ensure agreement between the parties about the inputs for the computation, we additionally assume a bulletin board. Through this bulletin board, parties can publish messages which can then be retrieved by any other party. Messages on the bulletin board are authenticated. In our protocol, we denote a party posting a message m as Post(m). For convenience, we don't explicitly denote a party retrieving information from the bulletin board; instead, we take Post(m) to mean that any party can now use the value for m.
Mixed Commitment Scheme
We use a commitment scheme, which allows a party to commit to a certain value, without revealing that value to other parties, but, when at a later time this value is revealed, the other parties can be certain that the revealed value is equal to the original committed to value. Each party has its own public commitment key k and a commitment to a value v using randomness r is denoted Commit k (v; r). Because, given explicit randomness, the commitment algorithm is deterministic, the commitment can be opened by simply revealing (v, r). Then any party can verify the commitment by simply recomputing it. To ensure input independence, the commitment scheme must be non-malleable. Each input party will produce one commitment, so each commitment key is used only once.
In particular, we use a so-called "mixed commitment scheme" [14] . In such a scheme, commitment keys can be generated in two ways. First, they can be generated such that the scheme is perfectly binding and computationally hiding, and a trapdoor exists with which the committed value can be extracted. Second, they can be generated such that the scheme is perfectly hiding and computationally binding, and a trapdoor exists with which commitments can be opened to any value. Moreover, the keys generated in the two ways should be computationally indistinguishable. In our protocol, commitment keys of the first, i.e., perfectly binding, kind are generated for all input parties by a trusted party (and the trapdoor thrown away), which we model by a hybrid call k 1 , . . . , k l ← ComGen. (In the simulator used for the security proof, commitment keys of the first kind are generated for corrupted input parties and commitment keys of the second kind are generated for honest input parties, with the trapdoors used when simulating the adversary.) Mixed commitments can be instantiated efficiently, e.g., using a cryptographic hash function in the random oracle model; or using Paillier encryption [14] : in this latter case, perfectly binding commitment keys are
Overview of the Protocol Our protocol is shown as Algorithm 4. The protocol starts with hybrid calls to obtain the trusted commitment keys and Trinocchio evaluation and verification keys (lines 2-3). The remainder of the protocol consists of the input phase (lines [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , in which the input parties provide their inputs to the workers; the computation phase, in which the workers compute the function and Pinocchio proof (lines 17-31); and the result phase, in which the result parties obtain the output from the workers and verify its correctness (lines 32-41).
Input Phase In the input phase, each input party provides its input to the workers. Compared to the single-client case, in which the input party simply provided secret shares of its inputs, we need to take several additional steps. Namely, we need each input party to provide a block for its inputs that other parties can use to verify the proof; and we need to guarantee input independence, namely, that input parties cannot choose their inputs depending on those of others. To achieve these goals, we proceed as follows. First, each input party computes a block for its input (line 5). Having each input party post its block on the bulletin board would break input independence (in effect, it binds the input parties who provide the blocks first). We circumvent this by letting each input party post a commitment to its block first (line 6). After all commitments have been posted, the input parties post the openings to the commitments, i.e., the blocks and commitment randomness (line 7). (This guarantees input independence because in the security proof, the inputs of the honest parties can still be changed after the corrupted parties provide their inputs.) After this, the validity of the commitments (line 9) and blocks (line 10) are checked; if any input party provided incorrect information, the computation is aborted. Note that ProofBlock used by the input parties could already be considered a commitment scheme [12] , however, because of the way the CRS is constructed and used in the security proof for the protocol, we cannot make use of the trapdoor that would make it equivocable.
After the input blocks have been posted and checked, the inputs are provided to the workers in the form of (2θ, n) shares (line 11). The shared information is both input [x i ] and block randomness [δ v,i ], [δ w,i ], [δ y,i ]: the workers need this latter information to compute the proof's H 1 element. Note that we use (2θ, n) shares: because n = 2θ + 1, the shares of all workers recombine to a unique value and we do not need to worry about input parties handing out inconsistent shares. The workers check that the shares correspond to the broadcast block by computing additive shares of the block, posting them, and checking if their Shamir recombination (denoted by Combine) matches the value on the bulletin board (lines [13] [14] [15] . Finally, the (2θ, n)-shares are converted into (θ, n)-shares (each worker (θ, n)-shares its share and applies recombination a la [19] ) used for the remainder of the computation (line 16).
Computation Phase In the computation phase, the workers compute function f , and produce a Pinocchio proof that this computation was performed correctly. The computation of f (line 17) and coefficients H of the polynomial h = (v ·w − y)/t (lines [18] [19] [20] [21] are the same as in the single-client case. To generate the proof block for the internal wires, the workers first generate shared random values Jδ v,mid K, Jδ w,mid K, Jδ y,mid K (line 22): for instance, by letting each party share a random value or using pseudo-random secret sharing. They then call ProofBlock to produce the block using the shared wires and randomness (line 23). The blocks for the result parties are generated in the same way (lines [24] [25] [26] . The coefficients of the randomised quotient polynomial H are computed from H analogously to the zero-knowledge variant of Pinocchio (Appendix A.3); note that this requires computing overall randomness δ v , δ w , δ y that is the sum of the randomness from all blocks in the proof. This gives (2θ, n) shares [
Having computed shares of all proof elements, the workers now post these shares on the bulletin board so that everybody can combine them to obtain the full proof. Note that the shares of individual workers might statistically depend on information that we do not want to reveal such as internal circuit wires. To avoid any problems because of this, the workers first re-randomise their proof elements by adding a new random sharing of zero; for instance, obtained by letting each worker share zero or using pseudo-random zero sharing (line 31).
Result Phase In the result phase, the result parties obtain their computation results, and verify them with respect to the information on the bulletin board. First, the result parties obtain secret shares of their output values, and the randomness used in their proof blocks (line 32). Then, they combine the values from the bulletin board into a full multi-client Pinocchio proof (lines 34-36), and verify this proof (lines 37-38). Finally, they recombine their output values (line 39), check if the secret shares of their output values correspond to the posted proof block (line 40), and output the computation result (line 41).
In this section we prove Theorem 2, i.e., we show that our multi-client Trinocchio protocol (Algorithm 4) correctly (always) and securely (if at most θ workers are passively corrupted) evaluates function f . Theorem 2 directly follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
B.2 Trinocchio Correctly Evaluates f
To prove that Trinocchio correctly evaluates f , we construct a simulator that interacts with the trusted party for correct function evaluation shown in Figure 1 . The simulator S correct is given in Algorithm 5.
Lemma 1. For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, S correct is probabilistic polynomial time and the distribution ensembles Exec Proof. To prove this lemma, we will start from the Exec distribution ensemble and introduce increasingly modified distribution ensembles YAD i , each indistinguishable from the next, to finally show that Exec Trinocchio,A is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal f,Scorrect . The simulator operates by simulating the protocol with respect to the given adversary A, and finally returning whatever value the simulated adversary A returned. The lines in the simulator are labelled to explain which parts of the simulator mimic the real protocol, which are needed to interact with the ideal functionality, and which modifications are introduced and explained by the various YAD distributions.
The real protocol is aborted at several places if certain conditions are met. Note that this is always in response to checks on information on the bulletin board that anybody can perform, hence all protocol parties agree on whether the protocol is aborted. If the simulator follows the protocol and the protocol is aborted, the simulator sends ⊥ to the ideal functionality on behalf of any corrupt input party whose input had not been sent yet, and proceeds to send ∅ as set of result parties to get the result, disregarding any messages it receives from the ideal functionality. It also completes the simulation of A to obtain its output. This ensures that the distribution Ideal is well-defined for aborted protocols.
At various points, the simulator is instructed to terminate the simulation. This is not the same as aborting the simulated protocol. The simulation will be terminated whenever the simulator fails at some computation which is not part of the real protocol, but which is needed to achieve some security property, such as mimicking the real protocol. To terminate the simulation will mean that the output of the adversary in the ideal case will not be consistent with the output in the real case, i.e., it will signal an adversary that it is in fact operating in the ideal case. To show that the termination of the simulation does not enable the distinction between Exec and Ideal, we will show below that each of the conditions which lead to termination of the simulated protocol can only occur with negligible probability.
We will now very briefly describe the purpose of each of the distributions YAD i . Each consecutive pair of distributions is indistinguishable.
We now present the increasingly modified distributions YAD i , every time showing indistinguishability between consecutive distributions.
Algorithm 5 Simulator S correct (C, {x i } i∈C , z, λ) for correct function evaluation 1: I: input parties, W: workers, R: result parties, C: corrupted parties 2: for all i ∈ I do 3:
if i ∈ C then generate perfectly binding comm. key ki, keep trapdoor YAD1 4:
else generate perfectly hiding commitment key ki, keep trapdoor YAD1 5: generate modified (EK = {{BKi}i, . . .}, V K = {{BVi}i, . . .}) as in YAD3 YAD3 6: whenever the adversary queries ComGen, return (k1, . . . , k l ) 7: whenever the adversary queries MKeyGen, return (EK, V K) 8: on behalf of honest parties i ∈ I do 9:
sample commitment randomness ρ i YAD2 10:
Post(ci) Exec 12: for all i ∈ I ∩ C do 13:
extractQ i from ci using trapdoor YAD2 14:
if CheckBlock(BVi;Q i ) = ⊥ then 15:
xi ← ⊥ YAD2 16:
use the d-PKE extractor onQ i to obtain field elements δv,i, δw,i and δy,i and polynomials Vi(x), Wi(x) and Yi(x) of degree at most d − 1; if the extractor fails, terminate the simulation YAD4 18:
set xi such that Vi(x) = xivi(x), Wi(x) = xiwi(x) and Yi(x) = xiyi(x); if this is not possible, terminate the simulation
send xi to the ideal functionality on behalf of corrupt input party i Ideal 20: receive x from the ideal functionality Ideal 21: on behalf of honest parties i ∈ I do 22:
(δv,i, δw,i, δy,i) ∈R F 3
Exec

23:
Qi ← ProofBlock(BKi; xi; δv,i, δw,i, δy,i) Exec 24:
create ρi such that ci = Commit k i (Qi; ρi) using trapdoor YAD2 25: simulate lines 7 through 39 of the real protocol on behalf of honest parties Exec 26: F ← ∅ Ideal 27: for all i ∈ R \ C do 28:
if Qi = ProofBlock(BKi; xi; δv,i, δw,i, δy,i) then 29:
use the d-PKE extractor on Q to obtain field elements δ v , δ w and δ y and polynomials V (x), W (x) and Y (x) of degree at most d − 1; if the extractor fails, terminate the simulation YAD4 32:
set the corresponding entries in x such that V (x) = i xivi(x), W (x) = i xiwi(x) and Y (x) = i xiyi(x), where i ranges over the indices corresponding to the block Q belongs to; if this is not possible, terminate simulation
34: Send R \ F to the ideal functionality Ideal 35: Return the output of the simulated adversary YAD 1 The distribution ensemble YAD 1 is the Exec distribution ensemble, where the set-up of the protocol is modified such that the commitment keys for the corrupt input parties are generated to be perfectly binding instead of perfectly hiding, and the simulator keeps the trapdoors. This distribution ensemble is computationally indistinguishable from Exec Trinocchio,A based on the property of the mixed commitment scheme that the two kinds of commitment keys are indistinguishable.
YAD 2 For the distribution ensemble YAD 2 , the protocol is further modified by producing commitments to 0 instead of the input proof blocks on behalf of the honest input parties. When the commitments are opened later in the protocol, the openings to correct proof blocks are created using the trapdoor information. Additionally, the proof blocks produced by corrupt input parties are extracted from their commitments, although the extracted blocks are not used any further at this stage.
Indistinguishability between YAD 2 and YAD 1 follows directly from the indistinguishability property of the commitment scheme. The commitment scheme also guarantees that commitments produced by the adversary can only be opened to the extracted proof block, i.e., thatQ i = Q i for corrupt input parties i.
YAD 3 For distribution ensemble YAD 3 , we will again modify the set-up of the protocol, but this time of the evaluation and verification keys. This happens analogously to [27] 's security proof. Instead of sampling s, α v , α w , α y , r v , r w , β mid and the β i for 1 ≤ i ≤ l + m uniformly at random and generating the keys from these values, the set-up proceeds as follows.
For a given QAP of degree d, set q ← 4d + 4, then sample s ∈ R F. Next, set From this point onwards, the value s will not be used directly to compute the keys. Instead, any key element derived from s will be generated from chal. This restriction will be necessary to complete the security proof later. Randomly draw α v , α w , α y , r v and r w . Also draw a random polynomial χ mid (x) of degree at most 3d + 3 such that χ mid (x) is of degree at most 3d + 3 and χ mid (x) · (r v v i (x) + r w x d+1 w i (x) + r v r w x 2d+2 y i (x)) has a zero coefficient in front of x 3d+3 for all internal wire indices i, and χ mid (x)t(x), χ mid (x)x d+1 t(x) and χ mid (x)x 2d+2 t(x) have a zero coefficient in front of x 3d+3 as well. Such polynomials exist by Lemma 10 of [18] . Similarly, for each input and output wire 1 ≤ i ≤ l + m, draw random polynomial χ i (x) such that χ i (x) is of degree at most 3d + 3 and
Now, we will generate the evaluation and verification keys as if we had used the following
where i ranges from 1 to l + m. Because we are not allowed to inspect the value of s directly, we cannot compute these values explicitly. However, we can compute the evaluation and verification key elements from chal. Because r v , r w and various β's are still distributed uniformly, and r y = r v · r w still holds, the distribution of the keys is statistically indistinguishable from keys generated using the real key generation algorithm.
YAD 4 Distribution ensemble YAD 4 is produced in the same manner as YAD 3 , except that the d-PKE extractor is run on the adversarially generated proof blocks that satisfy the CheckBlock predicate. If the extractor fails then the simulation is terminated. Because the d-PKE assumption states that the probability of failure is negligible, YAD 4 will be statistically indistinguishable from YAD 3 . Therefore an adversary cannot cause the simulation to fail with better than negligible probability in an attempt to distinguish Exec from Ideal and the use of the d-PKE extractor on lines 17 and 31 is justified.
YAD 5 In addition to extracting the contents of all proof blocks, to produce distribution ensemble YAD 5 we will also attempt to retrieve the x values that constitute the extracted V (x), W (x) and Y (x) polynomials. If no x exists such that V (x) = i x i v i (x), W (x) = i x i w i (x) and Y (x) = i x i y i (x), then the simulation is terminated. We will show that an adversary that successfully causes this failure, i.e., with higher than negligible probability, can break the q-PDH assumption, as in the security proof of [27] .
Suppose an adversary manages to produce a proof block Q, corresponding to block verification key BK for which CheckBlock(V K; Q) holds and V (x), W (x) and Y (x), as well as δ v , δ w and δ y are successfully extracted, but no x exists satisfying V (x) = i x i v i (x), W (x) = i x i w i (x) and Y (x) = i x i y i (x). Let By Lemma 10 of [18] , the coefficient ξ q+1 for x q+1 is non-zero with high probability. We can then compute using only information in the evaluation key.
Recall from YAD 3 that the very first step in generating this distribution ensemble is to create a q-PDH challenge for some secret value s and in the rest of the process any information derived from s is computed based on this challenge. If instead of generating the challenge ourselves, we consider it a given, then the algorithm for generating YAD 5 together with an adversary that successfully causes failure can as a whole be viewed as an algorithm that breaks the q-PDH assumption.
This justifies the extraction of all wire values from proof blocks on lines 18 and 32 of S correct . If this is not the case then the simulation is terminated. We will show that the probability of an adversary forcing this failure is negligible, as an algorithm that successfully manages to cause such a failure can be used to break the 2q-SDH assumption, closely following the security proof of [27] .
Let V (x) = k i=0 x i v i (x), W (x) = k i=0 x i w i (x), and Y (x) = k i=0 x i y i (x). Suppose that t(x) does not divide p(x) = V (x)W (x) − Y (x). Let r be a root of t(x) but not of p(x) and let T (x) = t(x)/(x − r). Let d(x) = gcd(t(x), p(x)) and a(x) and b(x) be polynomials of degree at most 2d − 1 and d − 1 respectively such that a(x)t(x) + b(x)p(x) = d(x). Set A(x) = a(x)T (x)/d(x) and B(x) = b(x)T (x)/d(x). These polynomials have no denominator since d(x) divides T (x). Then A(x)t(x) + B(x)p(x) = T (x). Dividing by t(x), we have A(x) + B(x)p(x)/t(x) − 1/(x − r). Note that H 1 = p/t 1 . We can now evaluate A 1 and B 2 using terms in the evaluation key. From these we can solve e( A 1 , 1 2 )e( H 1 , B 2 ) = e ( 1 1 , 1 2 ) 1/(s−r) . Note that the q-PDH challenge can be considered an incomplete 2q-SDH challenge. If, as with YAD 5 , we again do not generate the challenge ourselves, but consider it a given, the algorithm for generating YAD 6 , along with an adversary that successfully causes failure can be viewed as an algorithm which break the 2q-SDH assumption.
Ideal The distribution ensembles YAD 1 through YAD 6 are indistinguishable from each other and from Exec. Through the distribution ensembles YAD 1 to YAD 6 , we have argued that the distribution of the adversary's interactions with real protocol parties are indistinguishable from its simulation by YAD i . At the same time, the outputs of the honest result parties in each YAD i are still according to the protocol. Comparing YAD 6 to Ideal f,Scorrect , we see that the adversary's output is unchanged, but now honest result parties get the value computed by the trusted party instead of the value from the simulated protocol. However, note that if the simulation in YAD 6 is not terminated, then the vector x is in fact a solution to the QAP corresponding to inputs supplied to the trusted party. Hence, because the QAP computes f , the values from x that are output as computation results in YAD 6 are in fact the output of f on the inputs supplied to the trusted party. Therefore, the outputs of the honest result parties in YAD 6 and Ideal are the same.
From Exec to Ideal Overall, the sequence of distribution ensembles shows that the real-and ideal-world executions of the protocol are computationally indistinguishable, hence the lemma follows.
B.3 Private Case
The simulator S private for private function evaluation is given in Algorithm 6. We show that it works in situations when privacy is guaranteed: Lemma 2. For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A such that at most θ workers are passively corrupted, S correct is probabilistic polynomial time and the distribution ensembles Exec Proof. The simulator mostly runs the actual protocol, using zero inputs on behalf of honest parties. However, it needs to provide the inputs of the corrupted input parties to the trusted party, and make sure that corrupted result parties obtain the result from the trusted party. For the corrupted inputs, note that the simulator simulates at least θ + 1 honest workers, hence it knows enough shares of the inputs of corrupted input parties to determine them and send them to the trusted party (lines [6] [7] [8] . In order to manipulate the corrupted results, the simulator simulates normal Trinocchio key generation with respect to the adversary, but keeps trapdoor s (line 3). It can then use s to make sure that the proof block that was generated for the adversary during the protocol run indeed opens to the output value for the result party that the simulator gets from the trusted party (lines [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Now consider what the adversary learns from the proof blocks and divisibility check term. As observed in [18] , the first, third and fifth elements of a proof block, V 1 , W 2 , and Y 1 , are uniformly distributed if the δ v , δ w and δ y used to compute those are uniformly distributed as well. This holds regardless of which value x is used. Furthermore, once these three elements are known, the remaining four elements are fixed due to the verification relations. Because all of the proof blocks generated in the protocol are produce using randomly chosen values for δ v , δ w and δ y , it holds that all proof blocks in the protocol are distributed uniformly randomly and do not reveal any information about the values they are composed from.
We conclude that the adversary sees no information that allows it to distinguish the real and ideal worlds, hence the lemma follows.
